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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Article VIII § 3 of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3) (1987 & Supp. 1991). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Assuming this Court concludes that summary judgment was 
improperly awarded defendant Curtis Industries, Inc. ("Curtis"), 
defendant B & B Amusements Corporation ("B & B") should not be 
forced to relitigate this suit. The standard of review involving 
decisions of summary judgment is as stated by the plaintiff in 
her brief; however, there is no legal support requiring this case 
to be relitigated as to defendant B & B. 
II. The trial court did not err as a matter of law in 
ruling that the standard of care of a common carrier was not 
appropriate in evaluating B & B's duty toward the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff has likewise appropriately stated the standard of 
review governing a trial court's refusal to give jury 
instructions. 
III. Should this Court consider plaintiff's arguments on 
appeal concerning testimony offered by B & B's expert witness at 
trial when plaintiff herself failed to properly object to this 
testimony during trial? 
This Court will not consider arguments on appeal where the 
party failed to object during trial below. In the absence of a 
transcript as part of a record on appeal, this Court assumes that 
proceedings at trial were regular and proper and that the trial 
court's judgment was supported by competent and sufficient 
evidence. Bevan v. J. H. Construction Co., 669 P.2d 442 (Utah 
1983); accord Howard v. Howard, 601 P.2d 931, 934 (Utah 1979); In 
re Estate of Thorlev, 579 P.2d 927, 930 (Utah 1978). 
The absence of a transcript precludes a 
meaningful review of the district court's 
denial of [plaintiff's] requests from relief 
from the judgment, . . • ; "appellate review 
of factual matters can be meaningful, 
orderly, and intelligent only in 
juxtaposition to a record by which lower 
courts' rulings and decisions on disputes can 
be measured. In this case, without a 
transcript no such record was available and, 
therefore no measurement of the district 
court's action can be made as urged upon [the 
Supreme Court] by [the plaintiff]." 
Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987) (quoting Sawyers 
v. Sawyers, 558 P.2d 607, 608-09 (Utah 1976)). 
IV. Assuming this Court chooses to consider plaintiff's 
argument regarding expert testimony plaintiff did not properly 
object to during trial, it was not clearly erroneous for the 
trial court to allow evidence offered by B & B's expert to be 
admitted at trial when (1) there is no support for plaintiff's 
claim that she was surprised by such testimony; (2) plaintiff was 
informed long before trial regarding B & B's theory involving the 
use of such expert testimony; (3) plaintiff opened the door for 
such testimony through the testimony of her own expert witness; 
(4) testimony by B & B's expert was competent; (5) the evidence 
offered by B & B's expert was relevant and probative in regard to 
the very claims plaintiff presented; and (6) the flawed-bolt 
evidence offered by B & B's expert did not necessarily affect the 
jury's verdict. 
This Court will not disturb the trial court's ruling on 
questions involving the admissibility of evidence unless it 
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clearly appears the lower court was in error. See State v. Gray, 
717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986); State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 
893 n.23 (Utah 1989). Assuming that this Court determines the 
trial court clearly erred in admitting evidence, such error 
requires reversal only if this Court concludes that absent the 
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
result for the party claiming the error. State v. Mitchell, 779 
P.2d 1116 (Utah 1989). "[A]n error is harmful only if the 
likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high as to 
undermine [this Court's] confidence in the verdict." Crookston 
v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 796 (Utah 1991) 
(citation omitted). 
V. Plaintiff has not met her burden on appeal of 
marshalling all evidence in support of the jury's verdict before 
arguing as she now does that there was not reasonably sufficient 
evidence to overcome her belief in the inference of B & B's 
negligence. 
A party claiming that the evidence does 
not support a jury's verdict carries a heavy 
burden. The evidence is considered in the 
light most supportive of the verdict, [and 
the appellate court] will not substitute 
[its] judgment for that of the jury where the 
verdict is supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. To successfully attack 
the verdict, an appellant must marshall all 
the evidence supporting the verdict and then 
demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the verdict, 
the evidence is insufficient to support it. 
Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985) (citations omitted). 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Rule 103(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides in part 
that "[ejrror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or 
excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected." 
Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Relevant Evidence means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence. 
Also, Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states: 
All relevant evidence is admissible except as 
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the 
United States or the Constitution of the 
State of Utahf statute or by these rules, or 
by other rules applicable in courts of this 
state. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible. 
Finally, Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure reads: 
HARMLESS ERROR 
No error in either the admission or the 
exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect 
in any ruling or order or in anything done or 
admitted by the court or by any of the 
parties, is ground for granting a new trial 
or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, 
unless refusal to take such action appears to 
the court inconsistent with substantial 
justice. The court at every stage of the 
proceeding must disregard any error or defect 
in the proceeding which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case. This is an appeal from a jury 
verdict concluding that B & B was not negligent regarding an 
amusement ride accident. 
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B. Course and disposition of proceedings below. Plaintiff 
filed suit against B & B and Curtis to recover damages for what 
she alleged were serious permanent injuries she sustained as a 
result of a minor amusement ride accident involving the parties. 
The court granted summary judgment to defendant Curtis. The 
court also ruled that the common carrier standard of care did not 
apply in considering defendant B & B's duty toward the plaintiff. 
Finally, during trial, plaintiff's expert "opened the door" to 
expert testimony later offered by B & B's expert, which evidence 
by B & B's expert came in without objection by plaintiff during 
trial and which evidence was otherwise relevant, probative, 
competent and admissible. 
C. Statement of relevant facts. 
1. On August 31, 1989, and January 29, 1990, plaintiff 
filed her Second and Third Amended Complaints respectively in 
this action alleging in part that based upon defendant B & B's 
contention and discovery plaintiff obtained, defendant Curtis 
manufactured and sold to B & B a defective machine bolt which 
B & B used to connect cars of a roller coaster that plaintiff 
alleged became disconnected resulting in her claimed injuries. 
(R. at 92, 123-32.) 
2. In those complaints, plaintiff also alleged that at the 
time Curtis manufactured the bolt and sold the same to B & B the 
bolt was in a defective condition that was unreasonably 
dangerous, resulting in plaintiff's injuries. (R. at 93-94, 123-
32.) 
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3. On or about February 6, 1990, the affidavit of B & B's 
expert, P. Thomas Blotter, was filed with the court referencing 
in part that "the failure of the bolt was not the result of 
operation or maintenance practices" involving B & B. (R. at 149 
(emphasis added).) 
4. Contemporaneous with the filing of the affidavit of its 
expert, B & B filed a motion for summary judgment with supporting 
memorandum and citations to the record indicating that a broken 
bolt had caused plaintiff's injuries, if any, and that based upon 
testimony elicited it was not negligent in the operation of the 
roller coaster. B & B also argued to the court that plaintiff's 
allegations based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should be 
dismissed since there was no evidence that the elements of the 
res ipsa loquitur doctrine had been met including proof that the 
accident was a kind which, in the ordinary course of events, 
would not have happened had due care been observed. (R. at 136-
154.) 
5. In opposing B & B's motion for summary judgment, 
plaintiff reiterated her understanding of B & B's theory of the 
case, namely, that the subject bolt broke and that B & B's expert 
was competent to testify thereto and would likely so testify. 
Indeed, in her memorandum in opposition to B & B's motion for 
summary judgment, plaintiff (a) acknowledged that Dr. Blotter's 
affidavit did not expressly state that the bolt in fact failed 
but only presumes as such, (b) affirmatively argued to the court 
that "a genuine dispute exists with respect to the question of 
whether the bolt in fact broke"; and (c) claimed that summary 
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judgment was not proper "even if there was anything 'defective' 
about the bolt when it came into B & B's possession." (R. at 
176-89 and particularly R. 179 and 185.) 
6. In plaintiff's second set of interrogatories to B & B 
served on or about April 27, 1989, plaintiff herself posed 
questions regarding testing of the bolts and the bolt's internal 
structure in inquiring whether B & B had ever performed any 
"periodic non-destructive testing, x-ray testing, or any other 
testing of the bolts (including the one which you claim broke) 
which hold the cars of the subject roller coaster together." 
(See Answer 15 to plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories.) 
7. On or about May 14f 1990, defendant Curtis filed its 
motion for summary judgment and supporting memorandum which again 
placed plaintiff on notice concerning the substance of the 
anticipated trial testimony involving analysis of whether the 
bolt failed and may have been defective. (R. at 214-22.) 
8. On May 29, 1990, plaintiff filed her opposition to 
Curtis' motion for summary judgment and again acknowledged 
therein her awareness of the "defective bolt" argument by 
claiming that the issue of whether the bolt failed was for the 
jury to decide and by acknowledging that B & B's contention was 
that B & B was not negligent but that the bolt in fact failed. 
(See R. 229-33.) 
9. On August 17, 1990, B & B filed a memorandum in support 
of its position that the standard of ordinary care should be 
applied to B & B at trial. (R. 271-82.) 
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10. On June 4, 1990, the court held a hearing regarding the 
defendants' motions for summary judgment. Therein, B & B's 
counsel again stated on the record for the court and plaintiff's 
counsel that it was B & B's theory that the bolt failed. 
(R. 548.) Also in that hearing before the court, plaintiff's 
counsel essentially admitted on the record that he knew B & B was 
claiming that a defective bolt had broken thus justifying 
plaintiff's suit as against defendant Curtis Industries. (R. 548 
at 20.) Plaintiff's counsel also admitted that the jury could 
possibly find that the bolt broke and attribute fault to 
defendant Curtis; and when asked by the court what evidence was 
going to be adduced to show that the bolt was defective, 
plaintiff's counsel stated that either plaintiff or B & B would 
likely present evidence during trial that the bolt broke and that 
the defective bolt was purchased from defendant Curtis 
Industries. (R. 548 at 27, 34.) 
11. On August 23, 1990, after plaintiff made her 
representations to the court in the June hearing, plaintiff filed 
her objection to B & B's designation of witnesses and exhibits 
urging the court not to allow B & B's expert, Thomas Blotter, to 
testify as to failure of the defective bolt by reason of the fact 
that B & B had not supplemented its answers to one of plaintiff's 
interrogatories. No allegation of prejudice was raised. (See R. 
293-96.) 
12. On August 23, 1990, plaintiff filed a motion in limine 
urging the court to rule that B & B could not present evidence or 
argument concerning B & B's proposition that the subject bolt 
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failed and was "defective." Again, it was plaintiff's sole 
position that since defendant had not concisely answered one of 
her interrogatories, B & B should be prohibited from presenting 
evidence at trial on its theory of the case. (R. 300-02.) 
13. On August 23, 1990, plaintiff filed a reply to B & B's 
objection to plaintiff's late designation of witnesses thereby 
essentially incongruently claiming that even though B & B should 
not be allowed to present its theory of the case because of 
B & B's "technical failure" to supplement its answer to 
interrogatories, B & B could not be surprised by plaintiff's 
"technical failure" in untimely designating economic loss and 
fact witnesses who should be allowed to testify since the civil 
procedure rules "shall be liberally construed to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." 
(R. 303-06.) 
14. On August 27 1990, B & B filed its motion in limine 
urging the court to limit the testimony of plaintiff's expert to 
those opinions offered during his deposition since plaintiff had 
failed to advise B & B of any changes in her expert's testimony. 
It was B & B's contention that to allow any such expanded expert 
testimony would be unduly prejudicial to the defendant and should 
be precluded.. (See R. 317-20.) This motion was eventually 
denied. 
15. On August 27, 1990, the affidavit of David L. Stott, 
the general counsel for the Public Service Commission of Utah, 
was filed with the trial court. In that affidavit, Mr. Stott set 
forth facts clearly demonstrating that amusement park rides such 
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as that involved in the incident in question are not considered 
common carriers in Utah. (See R. 346-47.) 
16. At trial, B & B's employees repeatedly testified 
concerning their extensive daily inspection procedures involving 
the amusement rides and the nuts and bolts connecting the 
amusement ride cars in question. (R. 549 at 49-50, 81, 93, 102.) 
Employee Corky Mertin testified that bolts involved in the roller 
coaster amusement rides had never broken before. (See R. 549 at 
53-54.) Mr. Mertin then stated that bolts had been purchased 
from defendant Curtis for use on B & B's amusement rides. (R. 
549 at 56.) 
17. In contrast to plaintiff's allegations that she had 
been hit from behind when a child in the following amusement car 
had flown out of his seat and struck her in the head, Mr. Mertin 
repeatedly testified that after the injury plaintiff had only 
stated that she had bumped her knees on the front of the car and 
there were no reports reflecting plaintiff's claims regarding 
having been hit from behind. (R. 549 at 60, 107-10.) Subsequent 
to the accident, employees of B & B searched for the broken bolt 
which had been connecting the cars in question. (R. 549 at 71.) 
After discovering a portion of the same, Mr. Mertin testified 
that the bolt did not appear abnormally worn but "looked like 
[it] had snapped like a pencil." (R. 549 at 79.) 
18. Plaintiff presented the testimony of David Clark 
Stephens, her accident reconstructionist, who testified that the 
case was relatively simple. (R. 549 at 146.) He discussed a 
"fault-tree analysis" which he stated was a method of system 
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safety engineering or looking at all the possible causes for 
accidents, (R. 549 at 146-52.) Thereafter, Mr. Stephens 
testified regarding application of the bolts in question 
including their intended tensile strength and designed ability to 
withstand force. Mr. Stephens was then asked by plaintiff's 
counsel to discuss his fault-tree analysis with respect to the 
alleged coupling-device failure and alleged lap-bar failure of 
the car behind. (R. 549 at 153-59.) In addressing the question 
posed by plaintiff's counsel himself, plaintiff's own expert 
testified that the bolt could have broken. (R. 549 at 188-89.) 
19. Thereafter, during voir dire examination by B & B's 
counsel, plaintiff's expert admitted that he had had no formal 
post-high school training in material stress analysis and no 
formal education concerning the studies of vibrations, rigid body 
dynamics, machine design, or engineering. (R. 549 at 196-97.) 
Nevertheless, plaintiff's expert volunteered that one of the 
possibilities for the failure was a defective bolt due to 
"hydrogen impregnation during cadmium plating of a bolt while it 
is being manufactured," which, as plaintiff's expert testified, 
was "the only other possibility [for the accident] that even 
[B & B's expert was] going to be able to come up with." (R. 549 
at 198.) 
20. Upon cross-examination, plaintiff's own expert again 
stressed without objection by plaintiff that the most probable 
defect in a bolt would be one resulting from hydrogen 
impregnation and that he "recognize[d] that a flaw could exist in 
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the wire that the bolt was manufactured out of." (R. 549 at 
221.) 
21. Plaintiff's own expert also offered on cross-
examination the following testimony: "I am sure that if the bolt 
had a flaw that reduced the tensile strength by 80 percent, it 
would never get sold on the open market." (R. 549 at 222.) And 
plaintiff's expert admitted that there are such things as 
"Taiwanese counterfeit bolts." (R. 549 at 222-23.) 
22. In connection with plaintiff's allegation that the 
restraining bar in the car behind her failed causing a child in 
that car to be flung forward striking plaintiff in the head, 
plaintiff's expert conceded on cross-examination that he had made 
no calculation regarding the same, did not know how far the bar 
extended, had made no specific measurements in connection with 
the restraint system, had made no calculations as to whether a 
child would be thrown completely from the car given a bar 
failure, had made no specific calculations other than "a lot of 
thought" as to the forces involved and the physics connected with 
the factors allegedly resulting in the accident and had never 
even measured the coupling joints of the amusement car in 
question. (R. 549 at 226-35.) 
23. Further, during re-direct plaintiff's counsel himself 
continued to ask questions of plaintiff's expert regarding the 
defective manufacturing of bolts and elicited the testimony that 
the problem with counterfeit bolts was "that the basic strength 
of material is reduced, so that with either shear or tension, it 
is going to have a lower failure value." (R. 549 at 239-40.) 
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24. Plaintiff testified at trial that prior to the accident 
she had been dismissed from her employment since she was not able 
to perform her duties satisfactorily and subsequent to the 
accident had been terminated from other employment for reasons 
unrelated to the accident. (R. 550 at 250-55.) 
25. Plaintiff also admitted she had had headaches in the 
past, she had suffered from back pain prior to the accident and 
was having trouble sleeping, her back bothered her at night, she 
had stiffness and spasms in her neck and pain from her neck down 
into her upper middle back. (R. 550 at 277-81.) Plaintiff then 
conceded that prior to the accident in question, she had been 
involved in an automobile accident where her car slammed into a 
cement post injuring her leg and her shoulder. (R. 550 at 
280-82.) Plaintiff also testified that since the accident she 
had fallen while water skiing (R. 550 at 286) and had fallen and 
hurt her back while playing volleyball (R. 550 at 286-87). 
26. Upon cross-examination, plaintiff admitted that 
problems with her employment occurred before her accident (R. 550 
at 340) and that her finances after the accident were not much 
different from her finances before. (R. 550 at 342.) Plaintiff 
also conceded that prior to the accident, she had been previously 
examined by a physician for severe headache problems (R. 550 at 
349-51) which had lasted for a year. (R. 550 at 351). At that 
time years before the accident she had told the physician that 
she had had trouble sleeping, awoke in the night for no apparent 
reason, had felt tired and worn out, had had problems with 
generalized weakness, had had problems with dizziness and trouble 
13 
seeing, and had suffered from eye pain, double vision, ringing in 
her ears, and frequent severe headaches lasting from two to five 
days which increased in frequency and severity. She also had 
told the physician that she suffered with nausea, vomiting, 
abdominal pains and musculoskeletal concerns. (R. 550 at 
352-54.) 
27. Plaintiff further admitted that she was taking strong 
pain medication before the accident, which medication was more 
potent than that prescribed for back pain such as that she 
allegedly suffered in this accident. (R. 550 at 355.) Plaintiff 
also conceded that prior to the accident underlying this suit she 
had visited LDS Hospital complaining of shoulder pain and 
headaches and noted on that medical record that she was taking 
Tylenol 3 for back pain. (R. 550 at 356-57.) 
28. Thereafter, plaintiff testified that she believed when 
the amusement cars became disconnected her car went down the hill 
and came to a stop like "slamfming] into a brick wall" causing 
her to be thrown forward against the front of the car, hitting 
her shins and being struck in the back of the head by a child 
passenger sitting behind her. (R. 550 at 359.) 
29. Plaintiff also conceded that although she saw blood on 
the little girl behind her who had allegedly bumped into 
plaintiff's head, she had never told anyone about it, she had 
never obtained the child's name, she had not described this 
incident in her deposition, and she did not tell individuals at 
the accident scene about being hit in the head from behind. 
(R. 550 at 360-64.) 
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30. At trial, Allan Scanlin testified as an employee of a 
private consulting firm that performed safety and maintenance 
inspections on amusement equipment and as an ex-ride supervisor 
with B & B with supervisory responsibility for inspections. 
(R. 550 at 295.) Mr. Scanlin stated that while working for B & B 
on the day of the accident he had seen the broken bolt in 
question and plaintiff had not mentioned that there was another 
passenger injured by the incident. Mr. Scanlin also described 
for the jury how plaintiff had only stated that she had bumped 
her legs on the front of the car and had never mentioned that she 
had been struck on the back of the head by another passenger in 
the roller coaster. (R. 550 at 302-03.) Thereafter, Mr. Scanlin 
identified an accident report document which referenced that the 
plaintiff had only hit her legs on the front of the car and that 
a bolt had broken and the car had coasted to > .;op. Mr. Scanlin 
also testified without objection that the document demonstrated 
that while plaintiff had only complained after the accident that 
she had hurt the front of her legs, the next day she was seen on 
a television news broadcast with a neck brace. (R. 550 at 312-
13.) 
31. B & B's expert Thomas R. Blotter was called to testify 
and identified himself as a professor of mechanical engineering 
at Utah State University and assigned to the space dynamics lab. 
He stated that he taught courses in Machine Design, Kinematics, 
Vibrations, Dynamics, Stress Analysis, Theory of Elasticity, 
Continuum Mechanics, and Finite Element Analysis. (R. 550 at 
380-82.) Since plaintiff's expert had opened the door to 
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Dr. Blotter's testimony, Dr. Blotter testified. without 
objection, concerning the issue of counterfeit bolts and the 
flaws and failings regarding the manufacturing of the same. 
(R. 550 at 385-87.) Thereafter, Dr. Blotter testified concerning 
his extensive evaluation and investigation of the accident and 
discussed issues involving his inspection, calculations, 
measurements, and photographs taken, the speed of the roller 
coaster and its stopping, slope, and maximum velocities, the 
design and possible wear on the bolts, and his evaluation of the 
coupling, stress and wear factors. (R. 550 at 388-405.) 
32. Next, Dr. Blotter was asked whether he had performed 
any inspection to determine whether there were any flaws in the 
coupling or the bolts; and he again responded without objection 
regarding bolt flaw inspections, dye-penetrant-type tests, 
fluorescent inspection, and dye-etching. (R. 550 at 405-07.) 
33. Dr. Blotter also testified regarding reaction forces, 
mathematical computations regarding inertia load and metal 
strengths, modes of failure, shear distribution and stress, and 
bending stress and force analysis. (R. 550 at 405-17.) 
34. Thereafter, when Dr. Blotter was again asked to 
evaluate the possibility that there may have been a flaw or 
defect in the bolts, he opined without objection from plaintiff 
that the possibility of a flaw in the bolt was one of several 
failure modes that he investigated which may have resulted in the 
accident at issue. (R. 550 at 417-20.) Dr. Blotter described 
the affects of flaws in bolts and refuted testimony offered by 
plaintiff's expert concerning wear. (R. 550 at 218-24.) 
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Thereafter he concluded ihat the most likely explanation for this 
accident would be a flaw in a bolt or a counterfeit bolt. (R. 
550 at 426.) 
35. Defendant's expert otherwise entirely refuted testimony 
offered by plaintiff in this case by discussing the fact that B & 
B\s maintenance of the amusement ride was reasonable and that an 
abrupt stop such as plaintiff claimed occurred was impossible 
given mathematical velocity decelerization and impact 
calculations. Indeedt Dr Blotter testified that the "slamming 
into the brick wall" stop that plaintiff described was u reality 
only equivalent to stopping at a stop sign in a normal way 
without sliding. (R. 550 at 430-40.) Dr. Blotter also testified 
that there would have been little if any forward movement from 
people in passenger cars behind the plaintiff thus refuting 
plaintiff's allegations she had been struck in I he back of the 
head. (R. 550 at 442.) 
36. On cross-examination plaintiff's counsel himself asked 
Dr. Blotter to further discuss the issue of c ounteifeit and 
flawed bolts and Dr. Blotter reiterated his opinion regarding the 
same. (K. * SO at 449f 4ci/\ 4Sf, 468-70.) 
37. On rebuttal, plaintiff testified that when the <at came 
to a stop it rested at a downward angle. (R. 551 at 43.) 
Plaintiff also again conceded I hat she had never told anyone 
except her attorney about another passenger striking her on the 
back of the head. (R. 551 at 488.) In response, B & B offered 
the testimony of witness Mertin who categorically stated that 
when he viewed the position of the cars after the accident, the 
17 
car in which plaintiff rode was at the bottom of the incline and 
not on the downward slope as plaintiff had testified. (R. 551 at 
490.) 
38. During trial, the jury was instructed concerning 
plaintiff's argument of res ipsa loquitur and told that if it 
found the elements of res ipsa loquitur to exist, such conditions 
could give rise to an inference that B & B was negligent, which 
inference would support a verdict for plaintiff, in the absence 
of any showing that offsets such inference. (See R. 377-78.) 
39. After trial, the jury delivered its verdict concluding 
that B & B was not negligent. (R. 399.) 
40. Plaintiff filed her motion for a new trial on 
September 28, 1990, claiming that she was prejudicially surprised 
by the testimony offered by B & B's expert whom she had herself 
decided not to depose prior to trial. (R. 412-19.) 
41. On October 9, 1990, B & B filed its memorandum in 
opposition to plaintiff's motion for a new trial conclusively 
establishing that (a) there were no errors of law and assuming 
such errors occurred they were waived and/or were harmless; (b) 
the law did not support retrial as to B & B assuming the court 
were to reverse its summary judgment as to defendant Curtis; 
(c) plaintiff had failed to present any evidence that B & B was a 
common carrier under the law to refute that evidence submitted by 
B & B to the contrary; (d) plaintiff during her direct 
examination of her own expert opened the door to the evidence of 
the flawed and defective bolt offered by B & B's expert by 
eliciting testimony from her expert on the issue of whether a 
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flawed or defective bolt played any role in the accident; (e) the 
evidence was more than sufficient to support the verdict; and 
(f) plaintiff could not justifiably claim prejudicial surprise as 
to Dr. Blotter's testimony. (See R. at 435-44.) 
42. Also in support of its opposition to plaintiff's motion 
for a new trial, B & B filed the affidavit of its counsel clearly 
demonstrating (a) that "the plaintiff, during direct examination 
of [her own expert witness], elicited testimony from plaintiff's 
expert on the issue of whether a fraudulent or defective bolt 
caused the accident"; (b) "that subsequently, counsel for 
defendant, counsel for plaintiff, and the court discussed the 
possible use of a rebuttal expert, Mr. Earl Kemp, to rebut the 
evidence introduced by plaintiff's counsel concerning whether a 
defective bolt caused the accident [and that] Mr. Kemp was 
expected to testify on the bolt issue"; and (c) "that after being 
requested by the court to see if Dr. Blotter could provide 
testimony on this issue, Dr. Blotter was contacted and later 
testified on the issues opened up by [plaintiff's own expert]." 
(R. at 445-46.) 
43. Also set forth for the court was the fact that 
plaintiff had not objected at trial to Dr. Blotter's testimony in 
a timely fashion during trial thus waiving her right to request a 
new trial due to any claimed error that occurred when B & B's 
expert was allowed to testify regarding a flawed or defective 
bolt. (R. 439-40.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. 
Assuming the court committed any error in granting defendant 
Curtis' motion for summary judgment, such error does not mandate 
retrial as to defendant B & B since (1) plaintiff was afforded 
every opportunity to present her theory of the case against B & B 
to the trier of fact; (2) the jury was instructed concerning 
plaintiff's theory of res ipsa loquitur and concluded that 
defendant B & B was not negligent; (3) plaintiff failed to prove 
her case of res ipsa loquitur as to defendant B & B; (4) an 
impartial jury has already concluded that defendant B & B was not 
negligent in this action; and (5) there is no controlling legal 
support for plaintiff's theory that this matter must be retried 
as to B & B. 
II. 
The trial court correctly ruled that the standard of care 
involved in this case as to defendant B & B was not that required 
of a common carrier given the fact that (1) plaintiff presented 
no evidence that B & B should be held to this higher standard; 
(2) B & B presented the undisputed testimony of state officials 
that B & B was not considered a common carrier in Utah; and 
(3) case law supports the conclusions that amusement ride owners 
and operators are not generally held to this higher standard. 
III. 
Since plaintiff failed to properly preserve her argument at 
trial concerning the issue of testimony offered by B & B's expert 
and since plaintiff through her counsel and expert herself opened 
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the door to such testimony, the trial court did not clearly err 
in admitting the same. 
In the alternative, if the trial court erred in admitting 
such testimony any error was harmless and there is no reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for the plaintiff absent 
such error since (1) the evidence was overwhelming that a flaw in 
the bolt likely caused the injuries claimed; (2) the plaintiff 
was not surprised regarding such testimony; and (3) the jury 
could have otherwise ignored such evidence and expressly 
concluded that B & B's actions were not the proximate cause of 
the exaggerated permanent injuries plaintiff alleged she 
sustained as a result of this minor accident. 
IV. 
Finally, plaintiff has failed to meet her burden on appeal 
of marshalling the evidence in support of the jury's verdict 
before arguing the insufficiency of such evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
ANY ERROR IN GRANTING DEFENDANT CURTIS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT DOES NOT REQUIRE A RETRIAL OF CLAIMS 
AGAINST DEFENDANT B & B. 
In Point I of plaintiff's argument on appeal, plaintiff 
urges this Court to rule that the trial court incorrectly granted 
summary judgment as to defendant Curtis necessitating a trial as 
to Curtis and a retrial as to claims against B & B. 
Unfortunately for plaintiff, however, she has offered no 
controlling support for her novel theory that reversal of summary 
judgment as against Curtis mandates retrial as to B & B and such 
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theory is at odds with general law elsewhere, analogous Utah law 
and common sense. 
Defendant Curtis has adequately set forth in its brief on 
appeal testimony offered by the plaintiff herself below 
indicating that plaintiff's own expert agreed that no case could 
be maintained as against defendant Curtis. It certainly was not 
B & B's fault that plaintiff's expert did not join in that 
opinion offered by B & B's expert as to the nature of the 
defective bolt causing the accident. Nevertheless, it was 
plaintiff's evident intention that the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur should be applied as against both defendants for the 
jury's consideration. However, even as admitted by plaintiff in 
her brief on appeal the res ipsa loquitur burden was in any event 
placed upon B & B which successfully proved to the jury that it 
was not liable for plaintiff's claimed injuries. (See 
plaintiff's brief at 25-26.) 
While B & B disputes that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was 
appropriately applied in this case as against it given the fact 
that plaintiff failed to meet the elements set forth by this 
Court as a prerequisite to applying the same (see Dalley v. Utah 
Valley Regional Medical Center, 791 P.2d 193 (Utah 1990)), over 
defendant's objection the jury was essentially instructed to find 
B & B negligent if it concluded that the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur applied (see R. at 377-78) and plaintiff has already 
admitted that the doctrine was applied against B & B which faced 
and met that challenge (see generally R. 550 at 380-470). To now 
require B & B to retry the case it won, assuming the Court 
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reverses the trial court's ruling on summary judgment as to 
defendant Curtis, would be improper, prejudicial, and unfair to 
B & B. 
In short, the jury in the instant case already considered 
plaintiff's theory as to defendant B & B and concluded when 
presented with all the evidence that B & B was not negligent. 
Plaintiff has offered no controlling legal support for her theory 
that retrial as to defendant B & B is mandated by any reversal of 
the trial court's decision below as to summary judgment in favor 
of defendant Curtis and instead only summarily claims that since 
she was injured it must have been someone's fault and defendant B 
& B should defend itself a second time to prove otherwise. (See 
plaintiff's brief at 22.) 
Importantly, after the court granted defendant Curtis 
summary judgment, plaintiff had the right under Utah law to at 
least place Curtis on the special verdict form for the purpose of 
having determined Curtis's respective proportion of fault, if 
any. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-41 provides: 
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant 
who is a party to the litigation, may join as 
parties any defendants who may have caused or 
contributed to the injury or damage for which 
recovery is sought, for the purpose of having 
determined their respective proportions of 
fault. 
Further, Section 78-27-39 provides: 
A trial court may, and when requested by any 
party shall, direct the jury, if any, to find 
separate special verdicts determining the 
total amount of damages sustained and the 
percentage or proportion of fault 
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attributable to each person seeking recovery 
and to each defendant. 
(Emphasis added.) In Godesky v. Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 541 
(Utah 1984), this Court considered the propriety of apportioning 
fault under the Utah Negligence Act. That case involved a 
personal injury action brought by a roofer who was injured when 
he came into contact with an electrical wire. The plaintiff was 
employed by Pride Roofing Company. Pride was dismissed prior to 
trial presumably due to the exclusivity of the workman's 
compensation remedy. When the case went to the jury, it found 
Provo City Corporation, the owner of the electrical wire, seventy 
percent negligent. The jury also found the owner of the building 
twenty percent negligent and the jury assessed ten percent of the 
fault to Pride, which was not a party to the action. On appeal, 
this Court centered upon the correctness of the jury's verdict 
and stated: 
This is precisely what the jury did in this 
case. It compared the negligence of Provo, 
Monticello [the owner of the building] and 
Pride and determined that each actor's 
negligence occurred to cause plaintiff's 
injury and that Pride's ten percent 
negligence did not supersede Provo's seventy 
percent negligence as a matter of law. 
Id. at 545. Although this case was decided before Utah tort 
reform legislation, there is no indication that it has been 
overruled and it otherwise clearly indicates the right that 
parties such as plaintiff herein would have had to join defendant 
Curtis on the special verdict form for purposes of apportioning 
its fault. Given these statutes and case law, if plaintiff 
wished to demonstrate that defendant Curtis was somehow liable 
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for her claimed injuries, she should have joined defendant Curtis 
for purposes of the special verdict form above and allowed the 
jury to make her case for her by assessing some liability as to 
defendant Curtis. The fact that plaintiff evidently made a 
conscientious decision not to do so should not work to the 
detriment of defendant B & B which has already presented its 
defense to plaintiffs theory of recovery and won at trial. 
Clearly, the sole case of Westinqhouse Elevator Co. v. 
Herron, 523 A.2d 723 (Pa. 1987), cited by plaintiff as support 
for her proposition that B & B should be forced to retry this 
case, is not controlling here and is otherwise distinguishable 
from the case at hand since it involved a defendant's claim that 
because trial counsel was ill and had been absent from trial it 
had been denied adequate legal representation, an effective 
defense and from asserting issues of joint liability. No such 
claims have been made here. In contrast, in a closely analogous 
case the court in Scott v* Webb, 641 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1982) held that upon remand for retrial between the plaintiff and 
one defendant another defendant could not be forced to retry that 
case where the error mandating retrial did not involve him and 
since 
[t]he rules of res judicata rest upon the 
policy of protecting a party from being twice 
vexed for the same cause, together with that 
of achieving judicial economy in precluding a 
party from relitigating the same issues. 
[Plaintiff] has had his day in court with 
[one defendant] and he cannot relitigate the 
issues again [as to that defendant]. 
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Id» at 332 (citations omitted). "The doctrine of res judicata 
precludes subsequent relitigation by the same parties of a 
question of law or issue of fact which has been determined by a 
court of competent jurisdiction." McGuire v. Commercial Union 
Insurance Co., 431 S.W.2d 347, 352 (Tex. 1968); accord Madsen v. 
Borthick, 709 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988). Principles of due process 
are also violated when the rules of res judicata are ignored. 
Cf. Benson v. Wanda Petroleum Co., 468 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. 
1971) ("Due process requires that the rule of collateral estoppel 
operate only against persons who have had their day in 
court . . . .") . 
Since any reversal of the trial court's ruling granting 
defendant Curtis summary judgment involves no error as to any 
court ruling involving defendant B & B, forcing B & B to retry 
this case would offend traditional res judicata principles and 
notions of due process. Certainly, after the court granted 
Curtis summary judgment if plaintiff thought her claims could be 
irreversibly prejudiced by trying this case against B & B alone 
without defendant Curtis being present, she should have moved 
under this Court's rules for an order granting an interlocutory 
appeal to obtain review and possible reversal of the trial 
court's granting of summary judgment to Curtis. Her failure or 
tactical decision not to do so should not ultimately work to the 
prejudice of B & B. 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF 
CARE IN THIS CASE AND SO INSTRUCTED THE JURY. 
Although plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in 
refusing to impose on B & B a standard of care tantamount to that 
imposed on common carriers, plaintiff's position lacks merit 
under the law and facts of this case. 
As commentators have noted, "courts generally do not require 
of [an owner or operator of an amusement ride or device] the high 
degree of care expected of common carriers of passengers for 
hire." 4 Am. Jur. 2d Amusements and Exhibits § 88 (and cases 
cited therein); see also Annotation, Liability of Owner, Lessee, 
or Operator for Injury or Death on or Near Loop-O-Plane, Ferris 
Wheel, Miniature Car, or Similar Rides, 86 A.L.R.2d 350 (and 
cases cited therein); Annotation, Liability for Injury to One on 
or Near Merry-Go-Round, 75 A.L.R.2d 792 (and cases cited 
therein); Annotation, Liability to Patron of Scenic Railway, 
Roller Coaster, or Miniature Railway, 66 A.L.R.2d 689 (and cases 
cited therein) [collectively referred to hereinafter as 
"Treatises"]. Nearly all the cases reviewed by the above-cited 
commentators involved rides or devices where the passengers 
surrendered themselves to the care and control of the owner or 
operator of the ride. See Treatises. While some limited number 
of courts have applied a standard beyond ordinary or reasonable 
care to owners and operators of amusement rides or devices, 
courts generally hold that the owner or operator of such rides or 
devices must only use reasonable care to see that these rides are 
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properly constructed, designed, maintained, and managed and that 
reasonable care in such respect is that which an ordinarily 
prudent person would exercise under like circumstances and in a 
like situation. See Treatises. 
In Lewis v. Buckskin Joe's, Inc., 396 P.2d 933 (Colo. 1964), 
one of only a couple of cases relied on by the plaintiff here, 
Chief Justice McWilliams, in his dissenting opinion, correctly 
stated: "[s]ome states have decreed that the duty is one of 
highest care, but the general rule is that the owner and operator 
of an amusement device has the less onerous duty of ordinary 
care. See, 86 A.L.R. 2d p. 350 and Am.Jur.2d, p. 212 [sic]." 
Id. at 947-48 (C.J. McWilliams, dissenting). 
As to roller coasters, scenic railways, or miniature 
railways in particular, "[a] number of cases have specifically 
defined the duty of care owed by the owner or operator of a 
roller coaster, miniature railway, or the like, as that of 
ordinary or reasonable care, in the construction, maintenance, 
and operation of the amusement facility, for the safety of 
patrons." 4 Am. Jur. 2d Amusements and Exhibits § 90, at 215. 
This is the general view. See id. (and cases cited therein); 
Annotation, Liability to Patrons of Scenic Railway, Roller 
Coaster, or Miniature Railway, 66 A.L.R.2d 689 (and cases cited 
therein). 
In holding that owners or operators of amusement rides are 
held to the standard of ordinary care of a reasonable owner or 
operator in like circumstances, courts have discussed the 
distinctions between a common carrier and an owner or operator of 
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an amusement park device and the rationale which supports the 
imposition of the reasonable care standard. For example, in 
Harlan v. Six Flags Over Georgia, Inc., 250 Ga. 352, 297 S.E.2d 
469 (1982), the Georgia Supreme Court held: 
We disagree with [plaintiff's] contention 
that [the amusement ride] is a public 
conveyance, therefore rendering Six Flags a 
carrier owing its passengers an extraordinary 
duty of care under Ga. Code §§ 18-201 and 18-
204. 
We find it easy to distinguish between 
operation of elevators, taxicabs, buses, and 
railroads, which are instruments of 
transportation that must be used by people to 
travel from one place to another, and 
operation of [the amusement ride] and similar 
instruments, which are not. Passengers board 
elevators and amusement rides with dissimilar 
expectations. Persons using ordinary 
transportation devices, such as elevators and 
buses, normally expect to be carried safely, 
securely, and without incident to their 
destination. Amusement ride passengers 
intend to be conveyed thrillingly to a place 
at, or near to, the point they originally 
boarded, so that carriage is incidental. 
There is no transport involved with [the 
amusement ride]. Its riders seek a sensation 
of speed and movement for the sake of 
entertainment and thrills. [The amusement 
ride] is not a public conveyance within the 
meaning of Ga. Code Ann. §18-201. The 
standard of care owned by the proprietor, 
owner, and operator of an amusement device 
. . . is a duty of ordinary care to his 
passengers. 
Id. at 469 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in reversing the lower court's imposition of the 
common carrier standard of care on an owner and operator of an 
amusement ride the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled: 
The proper standard then to be applied 
to the present defendant's conduct in this 
case is that of the ordinary care of a 
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reasonably prudent man under the 
circumstances. If he uses a measure of care 
and diligence proportioned to the occasion, 
its possibilities and its dangers, he has 
fulfilled his legal duty. Dickerson v. Conn. 
Co., 98 Conn. 87, 118 Atl. 518. The trial 
court erred in its charge as to the character 
of care required. 
It may be said that there is ample 
justification for the ruling made in the fact 
that the revolving cars or boats are quite 
similar to the moving trains upon a railroad 
in the motive power employed and in the 
considerable hazard of operation of each. 
But the rule applied is not governed bv such 
considerations, but rather founded upon the 
occasion of use of the respective 
instrumentalities. One traveling upon his 
lawful occasions must perforce use the 
ordinary means of transportation, and is 
practically compelled to place himself in the 
care of carriers of passengers, and so the 
rule applied to carriers holds them to the 
highest degree of care and diligence. On the 
other hand, one desiring for his delectation 
to make use of pleasure-giving devices 
similar to the one in guestion is under no 
impulsion of business or personal necessity. 
He is seeking entertainment, and, when 
invited by manager to avail himself of the 
equipment provided by certain forms of 
amusement, he can properly ask only that he 
be not exposed by the carelessness of those 
in charge of any given instrumentality to 
harm preventable by care appropriate to the 
operation of such instrumentality. 
Firszt v. Capitol Park Realty Co., 98 Conn. 627, 120 A. 300, 
303-04 (1923) (emphasis added). 
Importantly, these cases involved amusement devices where 
the passengers had surrendered themselves to the custody and 
control of the owner or operator. Yet, as pointed out by the 
above cases, the rationale underlying the imposition of a higher 
standard of care for common carriers is based on the reason or 
occasion for which the instrumentality is used and the 
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expectations of the passengers. Persons with business or 
personal necessity must often use common or public carriers to 
transport themselves to their destinations and are thus compelled 
to place themselves in the care of such common carriers. In 
contrast, amusement ride passengers are under no such compulsion 
and make use of such rides for the entertainment they bring. 
Accordingly, owners or operators of amusement devices should not 
be treated as common carriers nor held to a common carrier 
standard of care. 
Further support for this distinction and the rationale which 
underlies it results from the fact that courts have made a 
distinction between public or common carriers and private 
carriers of passengers and that a private carrier of passengers 
for hire generally is required to exercise only ordinary care and 
diligence for its passengers7 safety. See 13 C.J.S. Carriers 
§§ 529, 530, 531, 678. 
Also, notwithstanding plaintiff's implications to the 
contrary, there are many circumstances where the common carrier 
standard of care is not applied to the owner or operator of an 
instrumentality which requires its passengers to surrender 
custody and control of their persons. For example, a person who 
gives a friend a ride to work in his or her car is not held to a 
common carrier standard of care even though the friend 
surrendered the custody and control of his or her person to the 
owner or operator of the car. To apply the rationale urged by 
plaintiff would defeat the purpose for the distinction the law 
makes between common carriers and owners or operators of other 
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instrumentalities and would impose an unreasonable burden upon 
the State of Utah and individuals and entities not before the 
Court. 
And finally, the facts presented in this case do not allow 
for a result different from the court's decision below. Although 
plaintiff presented or proffered no evidence to the trial court 
in support of her claim, defendant B & B provided the sworn 
statement of counsel for the very agency empowered by law to 
regulate common carriers in Utah, which evidence categorically 
demonstrated that amusement rides are not considered common 
carriers in Utah. (See R. 346-47.) Also, as noted at the trial 
below, it was necessary for plaintiff to do more at trial than 
just allege that the common carrier standard of care was 
applicable. Indeed, plaintiff had to present some evidence 
concerning industry standards or that B & B was considered to be 
a common carrier before that standard could apply to B & B. This 
plaintiff failed to do. 
However, even assuming that the court erred in holding that 
the common carrier standard of care did not apply, such error was 
harmless. The trial court held, and the jury was instructed, 
that the applicable standard of care was ordinary care, being 
that degree of care which a reasonably prudent person would use 
under the same or similar circumstances. The court further 
instructed the jury that "'ordinary care' implies the exercise of 
reasonable diligence and such watchfulness, caution and foresight 
as under all the circumstances of the particular case would be 
exercised by a reasonably careful, prudent person." (R. 374.) 
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The use of the words "under the same or similar 
circumstances" in the ordinary care standard allows the degree of 
care to change with a change in circumstances. Certain 
circumstances will impose a higher degree of care than other 
circumstances. Thus, if the degree of care of a reasonably 
prudent amusement ride owner or operator is equivalent to the 
degree of care required of a common carrier, the amusement ride 
owner or operator is held to such a degree of care by the 
definition of the standard (i.e., reasonable care under the 
circumstances). The ordinary care standard, by definition, 
imposes a duty to use a higher degree of care where the 
circumstances warrant such. In the case at bar, the jury was 
instructed to hold B & B to the degree of care which a reasonably 
prudent amusement ride owner or operator would use under the same 
or similar circumstances. This is all plaintiff can require, and 
plaintiff did not even present evidence of what a reasonable and 
prudent amusement ride owner or operator would use under similar 
circumstances or that such care was equivalent to the degree of 
care required of a common carrier under those circumstances. 
Accordingly, any error in the court's ruling was harmless. 
POINT III. 
SINCE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO OBJECT DURING TRIAL TO THE 
SPECIFIC TESTIMONY B & B'S EXPERT OFFERED, THIS COURT 
SHOULD REFUSE TO CONSIDER PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ON APPEAL 
REGARDING THAT TESTIMONY. 
This Court has long held the position that failure of a 
party to specifically object to testimony offered at trial at the 
time it is offered prohibits that party from claiming error on 
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appeal regarding the admission of such testimony. Indeed, in 
First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257, 
1266 (Utah 1984), this Court ruled: "an appellant has the 
obligation to provide an adequate record on appeal for reviewing 
a trial judge's ruling," and in the absence of a record, the 
Court must presume that the trial court's rulings were correct. 
Id. at 1266 (citation omitted). This Court has also reiterated 
the rule that "in the absence of a transcript, [the Court] 
assume[s] that the proceedings at trial were regular and proper 
and that the judgment was supported by competent and sufficient 
evidence." Bevan v. J.H. Construction Co., 669 P.2d 442, 443 
(Utah 1983) (footnote omitted). Howard v. Howard, 601 P.2d 931, 
934 (footnote omitted); accord In re Estate of Thorlev, 579 P.2d 
927, 930 (Utah 1978). The purpose behind this rule was stated by 
this Court in Fackrell v. Fackrell. 740 P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987): 
The absence of a transcript precludes a 
meaningful review of the district court's 
denial of [the plaintiff's] request for 
relief from the judgment, particularly in 
light of the party's contradictory 
assertions. . . . As we stated in Sawyers v. 
Sawyers, 558 P.2d 607 (Utah 1976) 
Appellate review of factual matters 
can be meaningful, orderly, and 
intelligent only in juxtaposition 
to a record by which lower courts' 
rulings and decisions on disputes 
can be measured. In this case 
without a transcript no such record 
was available, and therefore no 
measurement of the district court's 
action can be made as urged upon us 
by defendant. 
Likewise, this Court has noted that "when crucial matters are not 
in the record, the missing portions are presumed to support the 
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trial judge"; Mascaro v, Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 943 (Utah 1987), 
"and the grounds for any objection must be distinctly and 
specifically stated" since "the requirement of a specific 
objection on the records insures that the trial court will 
understand the basis of the objections and have an opportunity to 
correct any errors before the case goes to the jury*" Hansen v. 
Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted), limited 
on other grounds by Crookston, 817 P.2d 789. In Hansen, this 
Court ruled that the requirement that a plaintiff must state any 
grounds for objection in order to have arguments related thereto 
heard on appeal "assures that the appellate court will have a 
record of the grounds asserted below. If, however, the record on 
appeal fails to demonstrate that the trial court has been given a 
fair opportunity to avoid an error, we usually will not consider 
any claim based on that error." Id. at 16. In that case, this 
Court declined to allow the plaintiffs to supplement the record 
on appeal to show that required objections were made 
notwithstanding the fact that "a conference was held in chambers 
and out of the presence of the court reporter at which some sort 
of objections were made to the jury instructions. However, the 
exact nature of the objections made was not clear." Id. at 17. 
See also Zions First National Bank v. National American Title 
Insurance, 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988) (although appellate 
court may not defer to trial court's conclusions even on legal 
question great benefit may have been derived therefrom providing 
justification for refusing to consider appellant's claims for 
first time on appeal). 
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Applying these rules of law to the ample facts set forth 
above justifies this Court's refusal to consider plaintiff's 
argument concerning specific testimony offered by Dr. Blotter, 
which testimony was not objected to during trial below. Indeed, 
not only did plaintiff open the door to such testimony as 
demonstrated in the Statement of Facts, supra. and Point IV, 
infra, but testimony elicited from B & B's expert concerning 
counterfeit bolts and flaws in the manufacturing process of the 
same was also repeatedly presented without objection on the 
record by plaintiff. And, although plaintiff references in a 
footnote in her brief that although no transcript is made of the 
objection, "the context of this side bar conference requested is 
quite clear," such that she should be allowed to raise her 
argument on appeal regarding the testimony of B & B's expert (see 
plaintiff's brief at 18 n.5), B & B entirely refutes plaintiff's 
allegations that any such objection was made at trial just as it 
refuted this argument by plaintiff below when plaintiff urged the 
trial court to grant her a new trial (R. at 439-40). 
In short, the record speaks for itself and nowhere during 
trial did plaintiff object to such testimony as it came in. As 
the Montana Supreme Court noted in Phil-Co Feeds v. First 
National Bank, 777 P.2d 1306, 1312 (Mont. 1989), 
because the conference off the record is not 
reported, this court cannot indulge in 
speculation as to what the district court 
learned at that time. Insofar as the 
contention of the "appellant" is now raised, 
no objection was made by [the appellant's] 
counsel at the time of the action by the 
judge nor is their any motion for mistrial. 
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Therefore, there was no preservation of any 
issue of judicial misconduct for appeal. 
(Citation omitted.) 
Accordingly, plaintiff's argument concerning the testimony 
offered by B & B's expert should not be considered by this Court. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CLEARLY ERR IN ADMITTING THE 
TESTIMONY OF B & B'S EXPERT WITNESS CONCERNING FLAWED 
AND DEFECTIVE BOLTS, OR IF IT DID ERRf ANY ERROR WAS 
HARMLESS. 
Assuming this Court chooses to review plaintiff's argument 
concerning the trial testimony of B & B's expert, which testimony 
plaintiff herself triggered, elicited and did not object to at 
trial, evidence presented at trial below clearly demonstrates the 
appropriateness of the court's decision to allow the jury to 
consider testimony regarding flawed or manufactured bolts in its 
evaluation as to whether defendant's alleged negligence caused 
the exaggerated "permanent injuries" of which plaintiff 
complained. This is particularly true given the fact that 
plaintiff's expert himself opened the door to such testimony 
prior to it being offered by B & B's expert witness. 
Notwithstanding plaintiff's claims to the contrary, when 
considering arguments on appeal that the trial court erred in 
admitting evidence, this Court must apply the clearly erroneous 
standard of review. (See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 
1116, 1118 (Utah 1989).) Indeed, in State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 
1116, this Court ruled: "in reviewing a challenge to a trial 
court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence, we will not 
disturb the ruling unless it clearly appears that it was in 
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error." Accord State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313f 1316 (Utah 1986); 
State v. Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207, 208-09 (Utah 1985). This 
standard establishes that the trial court's superior position to 
appraise and weigh proffered evidence will not be circumscribed 
and its decision reversed unless based upon a review of the 
entire evidence presented the appellate court is "'left with a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'" 
State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 n.5 (Utah 1987) (citing Zenith 
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Researching, 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969)); 
accord State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987). Applying this 
weighty standard of review in light of the entire evidence 
presented at trial below mandates the conclusion that the trial 
court did not clearly error in allowing evidence by B & B's 
expert witness to be presented to the jury. 
A. Any error was harmless given evidence of flawed 
bolts provided by plaintiff's own expert and 
plaintiff's lack of surprise concerning such 
evidence. 
Even if the trial court erred in admitting evidence from 
B & B's expert concerning a flawed and defective bolt causing the 
accident in question, such error was harmless since (1) absent 
the error there is no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
result for the plaintiff; (2) the issue before the jury was 
whether plaintiff's claimed injuries were caused by defendant's 
negligence, regarding which there was overwhelming testimony in 
support of the jury's verdict; (3) the overwhelming weight of 
evidence presented supported the jury's verdict; and 
(4) plaintiff's testimony lacked credibility. In short, the 
38 
confidence in the jury's verdict is not undermined by the 
evidence offered by B & B's expert witness. See Crookston v. 
Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 799. 
Since the inception of this suit and throughout trial 
plaintiff was aware of the testimony to be elicited by 
defendant's expert. Indeed, by plaintiff's own admission in her 
second amended complaint, she knew at least one year before trial 
of the arguments defendant B & B would raise regarding flawed 
bolts and the expert testimony necessary for B & B to present the 
same. Further, through plaintiff's own opposition to B & B's 
motion for summary judgment and in the hearing held on the same 
plaintiff acknowledged that testimony regarding flawed bolts 
would need to be offered either through her own case presentation 
or through defendant B & B's expert. (See R. at 176-89; R. 548 
at 1-34.) Prior to trial, plaintiff also failed to argue in 
opposition to B & B's designation of Dr. Blotter that any 
surprise or prejudice would result from his testimony. Instead, 
plaintiff focused her argument solely on the theory that since 
defendant B & B did not technically supplement its answer to 
plaintiff's interrogatory concerning Dr. Blotter's anticipated 
testimony regarding flawed bolts, the court could deny 
presentation of such evidence at trial. Importantly, in 
reiterating on appeal this argument rejected below, plaintiff 
ignores the fact that when defendant B & B raised a similar 
argument to the trial court concerning plaintiff's attempt to 
obtain expert economist testimony and to expand upon the 
testimony of her own accident expert without supplementing 
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plaintiff's answers to interrogatories concerning such experts' 
proposed testimony, the trial court allowed such testimony even 
though defendant B & B was arguably surprised by the same. 
Further, as noted above, plaintiff opened the door to the 
testimony by B & B's expert concerning the flawed bolt when 
plaintiff's expert testified on the issue of whether a fraudulent 
or defective bolt played any role in the accident. Subsequent to 
plaintiff's introduction of this issue, counsel for B & B, 
counsel for plaintiff, and the court discussed the possible use 
of a rebuttal expert by B & B to rebut the statements made by 
plaintiff's expert on this very issue. At the court's 
suggestion, B & B's expert was contacted and later testified on 
this issue which was introduced by plaintiff's counsel through 
testimony of her own expert. (See R. at 442.) 
Since plaintiff's counsel opened the door to this issue and 
since the use by B & B of an expert to rebut the evidence 
plaintiff herself introduced on this issue was discussed with 
plaintiff's counsel and the court, Dr. Blotter's testimony 
concerning such was certainly not a surprise nor prejudicial to 
plaintiff and any error by the court in admitting the same was 
harmless. (See R. at 445-46.) 
B. Any error was harmless given the incredible 
evidence offered by plaintiff at trial. 
Also since the inception of this case and throughout trial 
below, plaintiff sought to convince the jury that defendant was 
responsible for permanent debilitating injuries she allegedly 
suffered as a result of a minor accident on B & B's amusement 
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ride. Nevertheless, a simple review of the evidence presented 
clearly demonstrates that plaintiff was not able to provide 
persuasive testimony on the elements of her negligence claim to 
justify the jury's verdict regarding the same. 
In direct response to testimony offered by plaintiff and to 
meet her allegations concerning causation and damage, defendant B 
& B presented the testimony of its expert witness on those 
issues. Importantly, however, the jury likely ignored the 
evidence presented by B & B's expert concerning flawed or 
manufactured bolts and instead concluded that defendant B & B was 
not negligent since it could not have caused the exaggerated 
"permanent injuries" which plaintiff repeatedly stressed 
throughout trial had resulted from this minor accident that was 
described as gradually coming to a stop at a stop sign without 
sliding. (R. 550 at 430-40.) 
The jury was instructed in part: 
If you should find that it was within 
the power of a party to produce stronger and 
more satisfactory evidence than that which 
was offered on a material point, you may view 
with distrust any weaker and less 
satisfactory evidence actually offered by the 
party on that point, unless such failure is 
satisfactorily explained. 
(R. 392.) 
The jury's verdict that defendant was not negligent as 
claimed demonstrates that the jury was convinced by the stronger 
and more satisfactory, competent, and credible evidence defendant 
B & B presented refuting plaintiff's weak allegations and 
unsatisfactory evidence that B & B had breached a duty 
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proximately causing the exaggerated permanent injuries she 
claimed she suffered. Indeed, contrary to plaintiff's initial 
allegations, plaintiff was forced to testify on cross-examination 
that she had suffered injuries before and subsequent to the 
accident for which she sought medical treatment. (See R. 550 at 
280-87.) The jury also heard that months before the accident 
plaintiff had been examined by health care professionals for 
headaches, backaches, trouble sleeping, dizziness, double vision, 
ringing in the ears, nausea, vomiting, abdominal pains and 
musculoskeletal concerns. (R. 550 at 342-57.) In short, the 
jury heard evidence proving that years prior to the accident 
plaintiff suffered from the very concerns she was alleging that 
B & B had caused. 
Also regarding the permanent injuries plaintiff claimed 
resulted from the accident, the jury witnessed as the credibility 
of plaintiff's own accident reconstructionist was severely 
impugned when he was forced to admit that he had not made the 
proper calculations necessary to draw reasonable conclusions 
concerning the manner in which the accident occurred. Further, 
evidence not objected to by the plaintiff herein and offered by 
B & B's expert witness demonstrated the unbelievable nature of 
plaintiff's claims that after becoming disconnected the car 
stopped as if slamming into a brick wall causing a passenger 
behind her to come forward and hit plaintiff in the head. 
In addition to the above, plaintiff's credibility also 
suffered in the eyes of the jury when (1) plaintiff exaggerated 
her injuries; (2) plaintiff attempted to attribute her claim of 
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injuries solely to the accident in question when considerable 
evidence pointed to prior and subsequent accidents and injuries; 
(3) plaintiff exaggerated the impact of the accident; 
(4) plaintiff was forced to concede that her testimony during 
trial was different from that offered during her deposition; 
(5) plaintiff was forced to admit that she had never told anyone 
concerning her allegation that she had been hit in the back of 
the head; (6) plaintiff conceded that the documents created 
contemporaneously with the accident did not support her claim 
that she had been hit in the head; (7) plaintiff's statement of 
how the accident occurred was clearly refuted by other witnesses 
who testified that the car in which plaintiff was riding did not 
rest on the downward slope but was on the bottom of the same; 
(8) no independent evidence was offered concerning the 
plaintiff's claim that a child had hit her in the back of the 
head when the lap bar on the following amusement ride car 
allegedly failed; (9) plaintiff was forced to testify concerning 
employment problems unrelated to this accident; and (10) medical 
records presented to the jury proved that plaintiff suffered from 
her claimed health concerns years prior to the accident in 
question. 
All in all, the jury had before it substantial, credible and 
competent evidence supporting its verdict that defendant did not 
breach a duty of care owed to the plaintiff in such a manner as 
plaintiff claimed causing the exaggerated injuries of which she 
complained. Clearly the evidence, when marshalled in favor of 
the jury's verdict, substantiates the conclusion that even absent 
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the testimony of the flawed bolt reasonable minds could not have 
differed as to plaintiff's alleged claims and there is no 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the 
plaintiff even if evidence offered by B & B's expert concerning 
flawed bolts had not been admitted. (See Erickson v. Wasatch 
Manor, Inc.. 802 P.2d 1323 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Hardy v. Hardy, 
776 P.2d 917 (Utah 1989) (citing State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 
120 (Utah 1989)) . 
POINT V 
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO MEET HER BURDEN ON APPEAL OF 
MARSHALLING ALL TESTIMONY IN SUPPORT OF THE JURY'S 
VERDICT BEFORE CLAIMING THE INSUFFICIENCY THEREOF. 
As this Court has repeatedly ruled, 
A party claiming that the evidence does not 
support a jury's verdict carries a heavy 
burden. The evidence is considered in the 
light most supportive of the verdict, and 
[this Court] will not substitute [its] 
judgment for that of the jury where the 
verdict is supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. To successfully attack 
the verdict, an appellant must marshall all 
the evidence supporting the verdict and then 
demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to that verdict, 
the evidence is insufficient to support it. 
Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985) (citations 
omitted). Certainly this standard of review applies when 
considering a claim such as that raised by plaintiff on appeal 
here that in the absence of B S B's expert witness testimony on 
the issue of a defective bolt "there would not have been 
reasonably sufficient testimony to overcome the inference of B & 
B's negligence" (plaintiff's brief at 38-42). Applying this well 
established standard to the case at hand demonstrates that 
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plaintiffs argument fails regarding the insufficiency of the 
evidence since she has not met her burden on appeal of first 
marshalling all the evidence otherwise in support of the jury's 
verdict. 
CONCLOSION 
Assuming the trial court erred in awarding defendant Curtis 
summary judgment in this case, defendant B & B should not be 
forced to relitigate a case it has won before the jury below. 
Further, the court correctly applied the appropriate standard of 
care respecting this defendant. Also, plaintiff failed during 
trial to properly preserve her objection concerning evidence 
offered by B & B's expert witness, and assuming the court 
otherwise erred in admitting such evidence, such error was 
harmless given the fact that plaintiff herself presented such 
testimony through her own expert witness, opened the door to the 
presenting of the same by B & B's expert witness and there is no 
reasonable likelihood of a different result absent the same. 
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